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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Joel W. Townsend*
Recent Criminal Cases Involving Lie-Detector Tests.-Four recent deci-

sions have been rendered involving the use of the lie-detector. In two
of the cases, its use and the admission of the test results were requested
by the defendant. In the other two cases, it was used by police officers
in obtaining confessions from the accused. The courts in all four
decisions refused to uphold its use or to admit in evidence the results
of the test or the confessions obtained thereby.
In the case of People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. (2d) 503
(1942), in which the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, one
of the assignments of error urged by the defendant on appeal was
the trial court's refusal of defendant's request to allow the results of
a lie-detector test to be admitted in evidence. The defendant in this
case had submitted himself to the lie-detector test while in custody
of the sheriff and after making a statement to the state police and
to the prosecuting attorney to the effect that he killed- the deceased
in self-defense. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in sustaining the
trial court's ruling, based its decision upon the following reason:
"There was no testimony offered which would indicate that there is
at this time a general scientific recognition of such tests. Until it is
established that reasonable certainty follows from such tests, it would
be error to admit in evidence the result thereof."
In the case of State v. Cole, - Mo. -, 188 S.W. (2d) 43 (1945), the
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced
to death for the killing of a seven year old girl by strangulation in
the attempted commission of a rape upon her. The defendant made a
written confession of the crime after his arrest and the confession
was witnessed by nine persons who testified on trial that it was given
voluntarily. At the trial the defendant pleaded not guilty, and objected
to admission of the confession as being coerced from him. At the
beginning of the trial, before any witness had testified, the defendant
made a motion that a lie-detector be used on all witnesses, including
himself, for the purpose of testing the truthfulness of their testimony.
This motion was overruled by the trial court before any witness had
testified. Later, after four witnesses had left the stand, the 'defendant
presented to the court out of the jury's presence an officer of the
St. Louis Police Department as an expert witness in support of his
motion, who testified to his familiarity with the lie-detectors. When
he was asked to explain how the machine works, the court sustained
the State's objection on the ground that any evidence illicitly obtained
thereby would have no probative value recognized by the Missouri
courts. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in affirming the defendant's
conviction, held that the question was not one of the privilege of
the accused against self-incrimination, nor was it a question of his
right to introduce evidence showing how the witness had reacted to
the machine when previously examined extrajudicially, but that the'
defendant's motion contemplated the compulsory use of the machine
on all the witnesses during the trial before the jury. The court then
said that in its opinion "the day has not come when all the witnesses
in a case can be subjected to such inquisitorial and deceptive tests
(or to drugs like scopolamine, or to hypnotism) without their consent.
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University, School of Law.

LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Furthermore, such dramatics before the jury would distract them
and impede the trial - this latter also-because it is necessary for the
inquisitor to ask both harmless, irrelevant and 'hot' questions in
order to bring out the contrast in the witness' emotional responses."
The court concluded that "no doubt the lie detector is useful in the
investigation of crime, and may point to evidence which is competent,
but it has no place in the court room." The court further held that
there was no error in the trial court's refusal of the defendant's
request that he be subjected to the lie detector test, as strictly speaking
he did not make a motion to that effect: he merely said he was
"willing" to have the test made. But irrespective of that fact, the
court went on to state that even upon proper request no error was
committed as such tests could not be made before the jury during
the trial, and defendant's offer of proof did not show that such method
of detecting guilt had sufficient scientific support, or wide scientific
approval as a producer of judicial proof.
In the case of Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945),
the defendant was arrested on suspicion of murdering his wife and
was held incommunicado, although he alleged that he requested the
-privilege of communicating with an attorney. After ten days of
interrogation for periods of one and a half or two hours each morning,
afternoon, and evening, the defendant made a statement telling about
the death of his wife and how he disposed of her body (which was
never found), but explained that her death was accidental. The police
officers were not satisfied with the defendant's explanation of the
cause of the wife's death and called for the assistance of a lie-detector
operator from Chicago, who interrogated the defendant and used a
lie-detector on him. Subsequently, according to police officers who
testified at the trial, the defendant admitted he strangled his wife.
This the defendant denied when he testified on his own behalf, and
he further contended that he had not requested nor consented to
undergo a lie-detector examination, and that the machine was attached
to his body and was left attached for over ten hours, except for a
period of time when the defendant removed it because his whole arm
became bloodshot. The defendant further testified that he was not
permitted to leave the chair on which he was seated and was not
permitted to go to the toilet, although he requested permission to
do so; that he was advised he would continue to undergo this treatment until a favorable statement was obtained, and that he had
nothing to eat from breakfast time until after 3:30 A.M. the next
morning. The defendant also testified that during the course of the
examination he was accused of being "heartless," "lower than a snake,"
and was referred to as "a son-of-a-bitch," and that the lie-detector
operator told-him that a little "Chicago treatment" would do him more
good than anything else; that "back there they hang them over a door
with handcuffs, with their feet about a foot from the floor and beat
them within an inch of their life." The defendant's testimony to this
effect was uncontradicted by any of the state's witnesses. The Chicago
lie-detector operator did not testify, nor did the prosecution account
for his absence. (According to information received by the writer of
this note, the operator was in military service, and on foreign duty, at
the time of the trial.)
The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the defendant's murder
conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that
under the facts and circumstances of the case, as appeared from the
uncontradicted evidence, the oral confession, if made, was obtained as a
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result of inhuman treatment and therefore involuntary. The court said
that continued and persistent questioning and accusations to the point
of exhaustion of a defendant may be just as effectual in obtaining a
confession as threats, promises, or physical abuse. The court further
stressed the point that it was guided solely by the evidence contained in
the record and that the decision did not preclude the introduction of
additional evidence as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession in
the event of a new trial.
In the recent case of People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 37, 69 N.E. (2d) 336
(1946), the defendant, a girl of 17 years, was suspected of murder,
taken into custody and retained without being booked, from a Tuesday until the following Saturday. The defendant was taken to the
Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, where she was
given a lie-detector examination, after which she confessed her guilt.
According to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which reversed the defendant's manslaughter conviction, the defendant had
objected to the use of the lie-detector without first talking to her
attorney. Several of the state's witnesses admitted that she objected
to the use of the lie-detector and was without the advice of counsel.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in reversing the judgment and granting a new trial, held that the lie-detector was used illegally, because
of the probability that its application influenced, if it did not induce,
the statement of the defendant. The use of the lie-detector was against
her wishes and so far as the court was advised, no court has ever held
that a lie-detector may be used on the accused without his consent.
Also, that since she was without the advice of counsel, it seemed
probable that a girl of her age supposed, as she said, that because of
the use of the lie-detector and the fact that it was attached to her,
she was required to make a statement.

